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19871 NOTES
Employers and Employees: Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson: Needed Ammunition for the Fight Against
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
Although women have been subjected to sexual harassment since they first
entered the work force in significant numbers,' they did not seek redress
from the courts until the early 1970s. 2 This late development of sexual
harassment as a legal claim can partially be explained by women's fear of
retaliation. 3 Women were also hesitant to call attention to the problem
because supervisors treated complaints as trivial and labeled the com-
plainants as troublemakers.' However, the problem is not trivial and a sur-
prising number of women are affected. Of the working women who re-
sponded to a survey conducted in 1976, 92 percent viewed sexual harassment
as a problem,' and actual experiences of sexual harassment were reported by
90 percent of these women. 6
Sexual harassment reinforces sexual stereotypes of female inadequacy and
fosters low self-esteem among women.7 Because many of these women feel
guilty and helpless, most have responded by quitting their jobs rather than
seeking assistance from their employers. This allows the harasser to continue
victimizing other women without ever suffering any consequences.' Not until
I. See L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 12
(1978). Although sexual harassment claims can be maintained by males as well as females, this
note focuses on harassment of females only because of the disproportionate number of women
who report sexual harassment as compared to males. See generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN,
E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 195 (1975)
(historically inferior position of women in a male-dominated work force has resulted in the
disproportionate exposure of women to sexual harassment).
2. The first reported sexual harassment case was Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'dsub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This
case involved a black woman whose job was abolished because of her refusal to submit to the
sexual advances of her male superior. The district court held that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972 did not offer redress for such claims; that decision was eventually reversed on
appeal.
3. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 52 (1979).
4. Id. at 49. As MacKinnon points out, women's fears of recrimination are justified by the
evidence. Men treat sexual harassment as jokes, and a woman who speaks out against such
behavior is often seen as emotionally unstable." Much of the information upon which MacKin-
non bases her findings comes from the testimony of Lin Farley before the Commission on
Human Rights of the City of New York, Hearings on Women in Blue-Collar, Service and
Clerical Occupations. See FARLEY, supra note 1.
5. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment of Female Employees by Nonsupervisory Coworkers: A
Theory of Liability, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 437, 437 n.4 (1981-82). Another author reports that
as many as seven of every ten women are subjected to sexual harassment while employed. C.
MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 3, 10.
6. Allegretti, supra note 5, at 437 n.4.
7. Frost, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 71 WOMEN LAW. J. 19 (1985). See also C.
MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 47-55.
8. Frost, supra note 7, at 19.
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1976, more than ten years after the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,1 did courts begin to offer hope to women who chose to take a
stand.'" Not until another ten years had passed, in its decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, did the Supreme Court give concrete support to
those who continue the fight."
In Meritor the Supreme Court held that a violation of Title VII may be
established by proving that discrimination on the basis of sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment." This unanimous decision was hailed
by women's groups as a major victory in the fight for equality in the
workplace.' 3 Those who have long crusaded to eliminate sexual harassment
welcome the decision and believe it will influence employers to make the
elimination of sexual harassment a significant factor in future policy-making
decisions. '
The purpose of this note is to analyze the impact of Meritor on future sex-
ual harassment claims. This is accomplished by providing the historical
development of sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII, by discussing
both the conduct that constitutes sexual harassment and the context in which
the harassing conduct may occur, and by examining the various theories of
employer liability adopted by the courts in sexual harassment cases. The note
concludes with a discussion of two cases decided since Meritor.
Historical Development of Sexual Harassment as a Violation of Title VII
Sexual Harassment Defined
Sexual harssment has been broadly defined as "the unwanted imposition
of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."'"
A definition that specifically addresses sexual harassment in employment
situations has been issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). In its "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex," the
EEOC states that:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)(17) (1982).
10. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'dsub nom. Williams v. Bell,
587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The reversal was on procedural grounds rather than on the
merits.
11. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
12. Id. at 2435-06.
13. E.g., N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
14. Wash. Post, June 20, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
15. C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 1.
[Vol. 40
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/8
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment. '
6
Since this section of the guidelines was not promulgated by the EEOC until
1980,17 it provided no assistance to courts in rendering earlier decisions.
Relevant Legislative History
Just prior to enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an un-
successful attempt to defeat the bill was made by adding sex discrimination
to the list of prohibitions. 8 As a result, Congress provided no legislative
history to guide courts in considering sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII. 19 To compound the problem of interpretation, Title VII does not
expressly prohibit sexual harassment. 20 The only significant legislative history
to which the courts can turn was generated in conjunction with the passage
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.21 In discussing the issue,
the House Committee on Education and Labor declared that "[d]iscrimina-
tion against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employ-
ment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given
to any type of unlawful discrimination." 2 2 Again, no specific reference was
made to sexual harassment. With so little guidance from legislative history,
courts were free to determine that sexual harassment was not prohibited by
Title VII. This is exemplified by a 1975 decision in which the United States
District Court in Arizona held that sexual harassment is a matter of "per-
sonal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism" and not a company policy to
deprive women of employment opportunities.1
3
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1986).
17. Cohen & Vincelete, Notice, Remedy, and Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 35
LAB. L.J. 301 (1984).
18. Note, Employment Discrimination-Defining an Employer's Liability Under Title VII
for On-the-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C.L. REV. 795,
797 n.19 (1984).
19. Id.
20. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a) (1982) (section 703 of Title VII has been repealed and is now contained in
this section).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2016(a) (1982).
22. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 2137, 2141.
23. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated mem.,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Application of the Theory of Disparate
Treatment to Sexual Harassment Claims
The current trend is for courts to recognize sexual harassment by a super-
visor as a discriminatory employment practice under a theory of disparate
treatment.2' Under this theory, three obstacles must be overcome before a
claim for sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII."1 A court must
find (1) that the plaintiff has suffered adverse treatment because of her sex,
(2) that the acts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint were a "term, condition,
or privilege of employment," and (3) that the acts are attributable to the
employer.
The first case in which a court surmounted these obstacles was Williams v.
Saxbe."6 The court ruled that the conduct about which the plaintiff com-
plained was "an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before
one gender and not the other."'2 7 This barrier was considered a condition of
employment imposed on only one gender and, therefore, a violation of Title
VII.2" All jurisdictions that have considered this question since Williams have
recognized sexual harassment by a supervisor as discrimination on the basis
of sex in violation of Title VII.21
Applying the theory of disparate treatment was complicated when the
EEOC promulgated its guidelines in 1980. The EEOC guidelines recognized
that sexual harassment could also constitute discrimination on the basis of
sex when it unreasonably interfered with an employee's working conditions.
Unreasonable interference occurred when the conduct of a supervisor or
coworker created an "intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. '"10
Under the theory of disparate treatment, an employee had been required to
24. Disparate treatment is the label applied to employment discrimination that occurs when
an employer treats some employees less favorably than others because of their membership in a
particular social group. Although discriminatory intent is usually critical to a disparate treatment
claim, discriminatory intent may be inferred from evidence that group members have been
treated differently from others. Disparate treatment is distinguished from disparate impact,
which is the label applied to employment practices that are facially neutral but which dispropor-
tionately burden a particular group. Such claims do not require discriminatory intent. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
25. See Allegretti, supra note 5, at 438-40.
26. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
27. Id. at 657-58.
28. Id. at 659, 661.
29. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (female air traffic controller subjected to
sexual abuse by supervisors and coworkers found to have been discriminated against on basis of
sex); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (female police dispatcher sub-
jected to sexual abuse by chief and coworkers established a claim for sexual harassment); Miller
v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (female employee who was rated as superior fired
for refusing her supervisor's sexual demands for favors from a "black chick"); Tompkins v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (supervisor who fired female
employee in retaliation for complaints of sexual harassment held to have violated Title VII);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (black female's position abolished for refusal to
submit to sexual advances found to constitute a claim for sex discrimination).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1986).
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show a tangible job loss. 3' This "intimidating, hostile or offensive work en-
vironment" harassment existed regardless of whether the female was required
to submit to sexual advances in exchange for job benefits. Therefore, courts
frequently held that this form of harassment did not meet the requirements
for a disparate treatment theory because the "terms, conditions or
privileges" of employment were not affected.
32
Several more recent decisions, however, have found that this new kind of
harassment is actionable under Title VII. 33 These courts have relied on
Rogers v. EEOC,34 which holds that Title VII affords an employee the right
to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult. Rogers involved a Hispanic employee harassed because of her
ethnic origin. 3" Because such harassment affects a "condition" of employ-
ment, Rogers held that it falls within the proscriptions of Title VII. 36 The
Rogers court also found that an employee's protection under Title VII
against ethnic or racial discrimination is not limited to economic aspects of a
job. 37 Thus, the need to suffer tangible job loss is no longer requisite to a
claim for discrimination. Courts presented with similar discriminatory
behavior in sexual harassment cases have applied Rogers to expand Title VII
proscriptions to sex discrimination.
3 8
One of the first courts to apply Rogers and adopt the EEOC guidelines in a
sexual harassment case was the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma. In Brown v. City of Guthrie,39 a police dispatcher was
asked on two occasions by a superior officer to remove her clothes. When
she complained, the superior officer teased her with magazine pictures of
nude women and directed lewd remarks and gestures toward her."0 The
Brown court found that this conduct created an intimidating and offensive
work environment. 4' Because this affected a condition of work, the police
31. The concept of "tangible job loss" can include any economic deprivation that results
from the refusal to grant sexual favors. This economic deprivation might be the loss of a job but
could also include a demotion, -loss of promotion or salary increase, or loss of other benefits.
32. See Allegretti, supra note 5, at 442-43.
33. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (when work environment pervaded
with sexual slur, insult, and innuendo, plaintiff may establish claim for relief under Title VII);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (employer liable where creates or con-
dones intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (condition of work includes psychological and emotional work environment,
and stereotypical insults and demeaning insults constitute sex discrimination).
34. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 238.
37. Id.
38. See sources cited supra note 33.
39. 22 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
40. Id. at 1629. In addition to the sexually abusive behavior discussed in the text, the plain-
tiff was videotaped while conducting a search of a female prisoner. This videotape was played
back frequently thereafter, with the commander commenting on the physical attributes of the
prisoner. Id.
41. Id. at 1632.
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dispatcher had established a claim for relief under Title VII for sexual harass-
ment.42
Another case often cited for the proposition that an intimidating or offen-
sive work environment is actionable under Title VII is Bundy v. Jackson.43
Relying on Rogers, the Bundy court found that conditions of employment in-
clude the psychological and emotional work environment.4 4 The court held
that an employee suffers sex discrimination when stereotypical insults and de-
meaning propositions result in anxiety and debilitation. 4 Thus, the "terms,
conditions or privileges" of employment are affected regardless of whether
the employee suffers the loss of tangible job benefits, 4 and the requirements
for applying the theory of disparate treatment discrimination are met.
The Meritor Facts
Although the trial court made no factual findings, a look at the alleged
facts is important to an understanding of the Meritor decision. The events
began in September of 1974, when Mechelle Vinson was hired as a teller-
trainee by Sidney Taylor, branch manager and vice-president of what is now
Meritor Savings Bank. During the course of her employment, which lasted
four years, Vinson was promoted to teller, head teller, and then assistant
branch manager. The parties did not dispute that each of these promotions
was based con merit. The parties also did not dispute that Vinson's termina-
tion came after an indefinite sick leave that began in September of 1978.
What transpired from the time Vinson was hired in September of 1974 until
taking sick leave in September of 1978 is still in dispute.
According to Vinson, Taylor was a father figure to her during her 90-day
probationary period as a teller-trainee. Initially he was helpful to her and did
not request sexual favors. However, in May of 1975, he took her to dinner
and requested that she go with him to a motel for the purpose of having sex.
When she declined the request, Taylor told her that she "owed" him because
he had given her a job. Out of fear that she would be fired, Vinson even-
tually accompanied Taylor to a motel where they had sexual intercourse.
Taylor continued to demand sexual favors, forcing Vinson to have sexual
intercourse with him forty to fifty times from May of 1975 until the end of
1977. Taylor's sexual advances also included his fondling Vinson's breasts in
the presence of coworkers, entering the ladies' room when she was alone, and
exposing himself to her. Vinson participated in this sexual relationship
because she feared Taylor, who allegedly had assaulted and raped her several
times. On one occasion Vinson suffered vaginal bleeding that required
medical attention. The sexual relationship between Taylor and Vinson
stopped in 1.977 when Vinson began a steady relationship with another man.
42. Id.
43. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 944.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Taylor denied Vinson's allegations and testified that he never had any sex-
ual relations with her. He denied fondling her, requesting sexual favors, or
even making suggestive remarks. He admitted only to taking her to lunch
along with another female coworker. Problems did not begin until Vinson
took excessive sick leave after she and Taylor had a disagreement as to which
of two employees should be trained as head teller. Taylor argued that Vinson
was asserting this claim in retribution for his instructing her about who to
train as head teller.
The trial court did not resolve these factual issues because it held that even
if her allegations were true, Vinson had not established a Title VII claim.
Both the court of appeals and the United States Supreme Court disagreed.
The rationale for their disagreement and its impact on future sexual harass-
ment claims are demonstrated by a further discussion of the development of
sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII.
Elements of a Sexual Harassment Claim
Sexual harassment has been a violation of Title VII since 1976. Sexually
harassing conduct was initially considered actionable under Title VII only
when a supervisor made the granting of sexual favors a term or condition of
employment, which in turn had an economic effect. After the promulgation of
the EEOC guidelines in 1980, courts began to recognize that sexual harassment
also affected a condition of employment when it created a sexually hostile
work environment, even though it did not result in loss of tangible job
benefits. In Henson v. City of Dundee,4' the two contexts in which harassment
may occur were distinguished and labeled. The first is labeled "quid pro quo"
harassment, and the second is labeled "condition of work" harassment."'
These contextual settings, originally suggested in 1979 by Catherine
MacKinnon in her writings on sexual harassment,' 9 are reflected by the
EEOC's definition of sexual harassment set out in the guidelines. Although
not specifically identified as such by the EEOC, "quid pro quo" is the label
applied to harassment when submission to the sexual advances is made "ex-
plicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment.'" 0
Harassment also occurs in a quid pro quo context when "submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting such individual.'"" Harassment occurs in the "condi-
tion of work" context when the conduct of a supervisor or coworkers creates
an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
52
The elements for a sexual harassment claim, first refined in Henson, pro-
vide that a violation of Title VII for condition-of-work harassment occurs
47. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 903-04.
49. C. MACKKINNON, supra note 3, at 211.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1986).
51. Id. § 1604.11(a)(2).
52. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
1987]
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when a plaintiff establishes (1) that she belongs to a protected group, (2) that
she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) that the harassment
was based upon sex, and (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition,
or privilege of employment.5 3 Henson would hold the employer liable in these
cases if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in ques-
tion and failed to take prompt remedial action.14 The first three elements are
the same when quid pro quo harassment is the complaint." The fourth re-
quirement for quid pro quo harassment enumerated in Henson is that the
employee's reaction to the harassment affected tangible job aspects of the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges.5 6 In such cases
Henson would hold the employer strictly liable if the harassing supervisor
relied on "his apparent or actual authority to exert sexual consideration." ' ,
If an employee receives promotions or other job benefits for submitting to
the sexual advances, or if she is fired for refusing to submit, then the harass-
ment falls within the quid pro quo category. When harassment falls within
the condition-of-work category, the employee is required to work in an en-
vironment that is sexually hostile or abusive. Although the employee is not
promoted in exchange for submitting to sexual advances or fired for refus-
ing, she frequently resigns to escape the harassment.
Before the decision rendered in Meritor, some circuit courts of appeals had
recognized that condition-of-work harassment constituted a claim of sex
discrimination only if the employee had suffered tangible job loss."8 In most
of these cases, because the abuse had become intolerable, the woman re-
signed from the job voluntarily. Because she had not been fired or demoted,
she could not show that she had suffered any economic loss attributable to
her refusal to submit to sexual advances. Some courts, therefore, turned to
the theory of constructive discharge in order to meet the economic loss re-
quirement."
The inconsistency created by the varying requirements for a showing of
tangible job loss has been resolved by Meritor. In recognizing a sexual
harassment claim when a hostile work environment exists, the Supreme
Court also found that no tangible job loss need be suffered. In so holding
53. 682 F.2d at 903-04.
54. Id. at 905.
55. Id. at 909.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 910.
58. An example of such a case is Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43
(D. D.C. 1980), the lower court decision from which the Meritor appeal was taken. Surprisingly,
this decision came from the same circuit which decided Bundy v. Jackson, one of the first cases
to recognize a condition-of-work harassment claim. See 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59. 682 F.2d at 907. An employee is constructively discharged from her position when the
work environraent is so pervaded with sexually harassing conduct that a reasonable person
would find the working conditions intolerable. The plaintiff in Henson was not found to have
been so discharged. This standard for determining constructive discharge was recently adopted
by the Tenth Circuit in Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986); however, Derr was
not a sexual harassment case.
[Vol. 40
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/8
NOTES
the Court adopted the rationale of Rogers and Bundy that Title VII affords
an employee the right to work in an environment free from discrimination
and that conditions of employment include the psychological and emotional
work environment.60
In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson agreed that Taylor's conduct had ceased more
than one year before her discharge. She also agreed that her dismissal came
as the result of matters unrelated to her claim of sexual harassment. The
district court ruled against Vinson because she had failed to establish a claim,
in part because there was no showing of tangible job loss resulting from the
sexual harassment."' The court of appeals disagreed that such a showing is
necessary,6" and the Supreme Court upheld that decision. Thus, the need to
prove economic loss is no longer necessary if a plaintiff can show that the
harassing conduct created a sexually hostile work environment that affected
the conditions of her employment.
Standard to Determine Conduct Constituting Sexual Harassment
Because the conduct usually encountered by the courts is so blatant, they
have generally applied a subjective standard rather than an objective one in
determining that the conduct is sexually harassing.'3 Examples of this blatant
conduct include express requests for sexual intercourse, 64 discussions about a
woman's means for sexual relief,6
5 inquiries into private sexual activities,
66
wagers about a woman's virginity, 6 and sexual slurs, innuendoes, and in-
sults. 68 A subjective standard requires that the courts consider the facts
peculiar to each case . 9 Factors suggested for courts to consider include: the
severity of the conduct, the number and frequency of the encounters, the
relationship between the parties, any provocation by the victim, the response
of the victim to the conduct, the apparent reaction of the victim, the general
working environment, the location of the conduct, and the male-female ratio
in the workplace.
7 0
The Meritor Court has now established that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome'. ' ' 7
This test, however, raises the question of what proof will be permitted to
show the unwelcome nature of the conduct. Meritor provides a partial
60. See supra text accompanying notes 33-46.
61. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1980).
62. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
63. Note, supra note 18, at 796.
64. Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
65. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
66. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1982).
67. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 934 (D.N.J. 1978), modified, 473 F.
Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
68. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983).
69. Note, supra note 18, at 796.
70. Id.
71. 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2406 (1986).
1987]
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answer by holding that testimony regarding a victim's sexually provocative
speech or dress is relevant to a finding that the conduct was unwelcome. 2
This issue was presented to the Court because of a disagreement between the
trial court and the court of appeals as to the issue of "voluntariness.'7
The district court had determined that because Vinson had voluntarily sub-
mitted to any requests for sexual favors Taylor might have made, she could
not maintain the action." The court of appeals, however, reasoned that
because the definition of sexual harassment is "unwelcome sexual advances"
voluntariness is not relevant to the issue of harassment . 7 The court of ap-
peals observed that "a victim's capitulation to on-the-job sexual advances
cannot work a forfeiture of her opportunity for redress," so evidence as to
voluntariness ;hould not be admitted. 6 The Supreme Court disagreed, find-
ing that although voluntariness is not a defense to sexual harassment, such
evidence is not irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether the sex-
ual advances were unwelcome."
The Court also suggested that the trier of fact should look to the "totality
of circumstances" to determine the existence of sexual harassment. The
totality of circumstances should include the nature of the advances and the
context in which they were made. 8 In the case of sexual harassment, for the
conduct to be actionable under Title VII, it must be so pervasive that it
"'alter[s] the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create[s] an
abusive working environment'. "7 9 The district court had not made this deter-
mination because it had decided that the voluntary nature of Vinson's sub-
mission precluded recovery.
For purposes of future sexual harassment claims, voluntary participation
in a sexual relationship will not be a defense. The standard for determining
whether conduct constitutes sexual harassment will be whether the advances
or other sexually oriented behavior is unwelcome. This means that if the sex-
ual behavior is welcomed by the recipient, then no claim for sexual harass-
ment arises. In determining whether the conduct was welcomed, a defendant
will be permitted to introduce evidence as to the plaintiff's dress, speech, and
mannerisms that led him to believe that she welcomed his advances.
Theories of Employer Liability
Two theories of employer liability have traditionally been applied to sexual
harassment claims. The first is that the employer should be held strictly
72. Id. at 2407.
73. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
74. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 42.
75. 753 F.2d at 146.
76. Id.
77. 106 S. Ct at 2407.
78. Id. Not all harassment is actionable under Title VII. In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234
(5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), the court had determined that a "mere utterance of
an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" might not affect a
condition of employment so as to constitute discrimination. 106 S. Ct. at 2406.
79. Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
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liable. The second is that the employer should be held liable only if it knew
or should have known of the harassment. A bifurcated standard of liability
has recently been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit that varies the application
of the theories depending on the type of harassing conduct involved.8" The
EEOC resorts to a different bifurcation, but this one varies depending on
who performs the harassing conduct. Although the Meritor Court declined to
decide the issue of employer liability, a discussion of these theories is ap-
propriate because the implications of Meritor are significant in this area.
Strict Liability Theory
In Barnes v. Costle, the employer was held strictly liable for the
discriminatory practice of one of its supervisors who made sexual advances
to an employee and then abolished her job when she refused them.8' The
reason for holding an employer strictly liable in situations where a supervisor
harasses a female employee is that the employer has delegated the authority
to hire, fire, or promote the employee to the supervisor. Since the supervisor
is relying on this authority to demand sexual favors, he is acting within the
scope of his employment, making the employer liable. This follows from the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior, which provides that the liabil-
ity for acts of a supervisor under such circumstances would be imputed to the
employer.82 Barnes implied, however, that an employer might not be held
liable if the supervisor was not acting in accord with company policy and the
employer was without knowledge.83
A more stringent version of this theory was applied in Miller v. Bank of
America. An employer was held liable when a female employee was fired for
refusing the sexual requests of her supervisor even though the employee had
failed to seek relief through the company's grievance procedure.8" Although
no other circuit has explicitly adopted the Miller standard of liability,8 5 an
equivalent standard has been suggested by the EEOC in its guidelines.86 The
adoption of strict liability by the EEOC is significant because although the
guidelines themselves carry no legal authority and are merely advisory, 8 they
are given great deference by the courts.88
Actual or Constructive Knowledge Theory
The second theory of employer liability was first espoused in Tompkins v.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co. The court formulated the following test:
Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or con-
structive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or
80. Note, supra note 18, at 795.
81. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
82. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958).
83. 561 F.2d at 993.
84. 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
85. Note, supra note 18, at 799.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1986).
87. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
88. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that
employee's job status-evaluation, continued employment, pro-
motion, or other aspects of career development-on a favorable
response to those advances or demands, and the employer does
not take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring
such knowledge. 9
Actual knowledge can be shown by complaints or other communications to
company management, and constructive knowledge will be inferred when the
harassment is so open and pervasive that the employer should have known
about it.90 Although this theory of liability is unique to sexual harassment
cases, 9' it has been applied by most district courts considering the question.
92
Bifurcation of Employer Liability Theories
Based on Kind of Harassment
In Henson v. City of Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit postulates that both
theories of employer liability are applicable to sexual harassment cases. This
bifurcated standard distinguishes between the kinds of harassment involved
and determines which theory of liability to apply. Strict liability should be
applied in cases of quid pro quo harassment, 9 whereas in condition-of-work
harassment the employer should be held liable only when it has actual or con-
structive knowledge of the behavior and takes no steps to remedy the situa-
tion. 94
Justification for this bifurcated theory comes from the difference in the
use of delegated authority in quid pro quo harassment versus condition-of-
work harassment." In quid pro quo harassment, the supervisor uses author-
ity vested in him by the employer to confront the victim with threats of
employment sanctions for refusal to submit to the requests. Applying strict
liability in these situations would encourage employers to more closely
89. 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1977).
90. Id.
91. The argument for this standard of liability is that sexual harassment cases are a unique
form of discrimination to which strict liability should not be applied. In a concurring opinion
filed by Judge MacKinnon in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), three reasons for
applying strict liability in discrimination cases were espoused. First, the employer is in the best
position to explain the discriminatory behavior. Second, the employer is in the best position to
control and eliminate the discrimination. Third, because the conduct involved is "questionable
at best," errors should be made on the side of avoiding conduct which may be violative. Id. at
999-1001. These reasons for applying strict liability to discrimination cases are not present in sex-
ual harassment ca;es. First, the behavior is usually not conducted openly and frequently does not
occur at the workplace. Second, because of the private nature of the conduct, the employer lacks
the ability to control it. Third, the acts themselves are not intrinsically offensive, but only
become so if they are unwelcomed by the respondent. For a further discussion of Judge MacKin-
non's opinion see Note, supra note 18, at 803-05.
92. Note, supra note 18, at 803.
93. 682 F.2d E-97, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 905, 910.
95. Note, supra note 18, at 809-11.
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monitor the acts of its supervisory personnel, to review employment decisions
made by supervisors, and to implement programs designed to deter adverse
behavior.
Conversely, in condition-of-work harassment, no official actions are taken
over which the employer can exert direct control. Nor can the employer im-
plement methods for acquiring independent knowledge. The responsibility
for notifying the employer falls to the victim. Allocating liability to an
employer in such situations only if it has notice would encourage employees
to come forward with complaints. This, of course, would be true only if an
effective grievance procedure was available to handle such complaints.
Bifurcation of Employer Liability Theories
Based on Identity of Harasser
The EEOC guidelines advocate that strict liability is the standard that
should be applied when a supervisor is the one performing the harassing
acts.9 6 This is so regardless of whether the harassment falls within the quid
pro quo or the condition-of-work category. If, on the other hand, the harass-
ment comes from coworkers, the guidelines require an employer to be held
liable only if it knew or should have known of the harassing conduct and
"did not take immediate and appropriate corrective action."' 7 The EEOC
espouses that if an employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors
regardless of notice, then the employer will seek to prevent the conduct. This
rationale reflects the argument that in any situation where a supervisor is
responsible for the harassment, he is relying on his delegated authority. 98 Use
of this power should be prevented and the most effective way to do this is to
require strict liability for all forms of supervisory harassment.
Implications of Meritor to Employer Liability
The inconsistency of courts in defining the conditions under which
employers will be held liable for sexual harassment has left unsettled this im-
portant question of employer liability. Although this is now one of the most
significant problem areas generated by sexual harassment claims, the Meritor
Court declined to decide the issue. 99 The reason the Court gives for this is
that the conflicting testimony as to whether Taylor had actually made sexual
advances toward Vinson had not been resolved. The Court did, however,
give some insight into how it might decide the issue when it finally confronts
it.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress must have intended an
employer's liability to be limited in some way when it included in the defini-
tion of "employer" any "agent" of the employer.'10 The Court also found
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1986).
97. Id. § 1604.11(d).
98. Note, supra note 18, at 810.
99. 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2408 (1986).
100. Id.
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that the court of appeals erred in determining that employers are "always
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors."°" The court
of appeals had placed heavy emphasis on the EEOC guidelines. Although the
Supreme Court also refers to the guidelines, it indicates that courts should
look to agency principles for guidance. When these principles are applied, an
employer is not necessarily insulated from liability simply because it is
without notice. The implication is that if a supervisor is acting in a position
of delegated authority, then he acts as the employer's agent and the employer
is liable regardless of notice. However, lack of notice will not necessarily in-
sulate the employer from liability in cases where the supervisor is not using
this authority or where the harassment comes from a coworker. As the Court
states, the "mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against
discrimination" will not be sufficient for the employer to escape liability.
0 2
In Meritor testimony was offered by the bank to show that it had a policy
against discriminatory employment practices and a grievance procedure to
handle complaints. The bank had received no written complaints from either
Vinson or other female employees. The Court, however, found that the
bank's particular policy against discrimination did not specifically address
sexual harassment claims and that it required an employee to complain to her
immediate supervisor first. Since the alleged perpetrator was Vinson's super-
visor, the Court indicated no surprise at Vinson's not having reported her
grievance. The Court did imply, however, that a grievance procedure
"calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward" might
provide a "substantially stronger" defense against employer liability.""1
The Court leaves open the question of what grievance procedures would be
calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward. However,
the implications are that an employer should have a policy directly addressing
sexual harassment claims, and the person to whom a victim reports the inci-
dent should be someone other than her supervisor. A procedure in which the
victim's identity remains anonymous would also be more likely to encourage
victims to complain and would provide a "substantially stronger" defense to
employer liability.
Meritor Applied
Because the district court had not determined whether Taylor's alleged
conduct had actually happened or was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of Vinson's employment, the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals and remanded the case. The district court's
failure to make a determination leaves unanswered the question of what con-
duct a court will consider sufficiently pervasive so as to be actionable under a
"hostile work environment" claim. Two decisions rendered subsequent to
Meritor may give some guidance.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2408-09.
103. Id. at 2409.
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In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,104 the Sixth Circuit addressed the
issue of hostile work environment harassment for the first time. Although
Rabidue had been fired by her employer for reasons unrelated to the harass-
ment, she alleged the acts of a fellow worker created an offensive work en-
vironment. The acts she considered offensive included vulgar, crude, and
obscene comments made by a male employee who was not in a position of
authority over Rabidue. Additionally, Rabidue complained that other male
employees displayed pictures of nude and scantily clad women in their of-
fices.
The Rabidue court held that the conduct must do more than create an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Not only must the con-
duct be of a kind to have a serious effect on a reasonable person's
psychological well-being, it must have an actual effect. In taking the totality
of circumstances approach suggested in Meritor, the court said it should con-
sider the "lexicon of obscenity" present in the workplace at the time a plain-
tiff is hired and compare this to the plaintiff's reasonable expectations. In the
words of one judge:
[I]t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes,
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII
was not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgot-
ten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for
equal employment opportunity for the female workers of
America. But [it] is quite different to claim that Title VII was
designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social
mores of American workers.' 5
The Rabidue court found that the harassment of which the plaintiff com-
plained was annoying but "not so startling as to have affected seriously the
psyches of the plaintiff or other female employees. '" 6
Another case, Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,1 °7 involved a female auto
mechanic who alleged she was sexually harassed by other mechanics. The
harassing acts included winks, propositions, slaps on the buttocks, and sug-
gestions as to her behavior while engaging in sex. The Seventh Circuit stated
that the threshold question for sexual harassment claims is whether the acts
rise to a level of hostility offensive enough to be actionable. The acts must
also cause such anxiety and debilitation that the work environment is
"poisoned."'' 08 The Scott court held that the plaintiff's allegations had not
risen to the required level, and it ruled in favor of the defendant on a motion
for summary judgment.
104. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 626.
106. Id. at 622.
107. 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
108. Id. at 213.
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